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Abstract
How do choices among information sources reinforce political differences on topics
such as climate change? Environmental sociologists have observed large-scale and
long-term impacts from news media and think-tank reports, while experimental
science-communication studies detect more immediate effects from variations in
supplied information. Applying generalized structural equation modeling (GSEM)
to recent survey data, previous work is extended to show that political ideology,
education, and their interaction predict news media information choices in much
the same way they predict opinions about climate change itself. Consequently,
media information sources serve as intervening variables that can reinforce and,
through their own independent effects, amplify existing beliefs about climate
change. Results provide empirical support for selective exposure and biased
assimilation as mechanisms widening political divisions on climate change in the
United States. The findings fit with the reinforcing spirals framework suggesting
partisan media strengthens climate change beliefs which then influences
subsequent use of media.
Keywords: reinforcing spirals; climate change; ideology; polarization; Fox News; public radio

1

Introduction
A U.S. Gallup poll in 2001 found that 61% believed human activities are the cause of climate
change. Over the next decade this percentage dropped into the low 50s; after 2010 it drifted back
up in 2016 to a new high point—but at 65%, it stood just four points higher than fifteen years
earlier (Saad and Jones 2016). During that decade and a half, however, scientists reported 15 of
the 16 warmest years on record (NASA 2016). At a time when scientists have identified critical
threats linked to changing climate—rising sea levels, melting ice caps and extreme weather
events of increasing frequency and severity, along with challenges to ecosystems, fresh water
and food supplies—the basic reality of anthropogenic climate change remains an issue of
political contention in the United States.
Divisions over anthropogenic climate change intensified since the 2008 and 2012
presidential elections. In 2008, almost identical proposals for a cap-and-trade plan left little
distinction between Republican candidate, John McCain, and Democratic candidate, Barack
Obama (Davenport 2016). In contrast, climate change became a distinguishing, although
underreported, issue in the 2016 presidential election where a stark contrast existed between
Republicans and Democrats regarding both the reality and the need for action. Social scientists
have explored factors that characterize or might help to explain this polarization in many
different studies (e.g., McCright et al. 2014, Dunlap et al. 2016, Hamilton 2016a, Carmichael
and Brulle 2017, Kim and Urpelainen 2018).
Countering efforts from scientists and environmentalists to educate the public on
concepts and evidence of climate change since it gained prominence in the early 1990s,
conservative elites and organizations saturated public discourse with arguments for rejection
(Jacques et al. 2008, Dunlap and McCright 2015). Over the last decade, science communicators
achieved limited success in gradually changing perceptions across party lines (Hamilton 2016a).
Research suggests, however, that individuals still often acquire, credit, and retain information
selectively depending on whether it supports or conflicts with their existing beliefs—processes
variously referred to as confirmation bias, biased assimilation, or motivated reasoning (Lord et
al. 1979, Munro and Ditto 1997, Taber and Lodge 2006, Corner et al. 2012). Moreover, to avoid
disconfirming information, individuals also prefer information sources that reinforce their
predispositions (Slater 2007, Zhao 2009, McCright 2011, Hamilton 2014, Feldman et al. 2014,
Jasny et al. 2015), or keep them informed of party and leadership positions (Darmofal 2005,
Brulle et al. 2012)—patterns of selective exposure. Education can aid these processes by
mediating media use (Zhao 2009, Zhao et al. 2011, Ehret et al. 2017), and interacting with
political identity to further polarization on politicized issues (Hamilton 2008, 2011, Hamilton
and Keim 2009, Hamilton et al. 2015b, McCright and Dunlap 2011). Whether selecting or
evaluating information, media sources play a critical role in maintaining the division over
anthropogenic climate change (Jasny et al. 2015, Carmichael et al. 2017).
Here, we examine that role by analyzing preferred information sources as variables that
might intervene between political identity and climate change beliefs. In this intervening role,
information choice reinforces existing prejudices regarding climate change. However,
information choice may also explain some variation on its own, which could make it something
that not just reinforces but amplifies divisions. In contrast with experimental studies of science
communication, we draw on nonexperimental, single-state survey data from six individual polls
conducted over a 10-month period. We apply generalized structural equation modeling (GSEM)
to characterize the background predictors of information source choices, the direct effects of
information source on climate change beliefs, and the indirect effects of background
2

characteristics on beliefs through preferred information sources. Confirmation bias, selective
exposure, and related theories suggest testable hypotheses that ideology, education, and their
interaction could influence information choices in much the same way they do for climate
change beliefs, so that ideological and education effects operate both directly and indirectly. One
other key hypothesis is that information choices exhibit independent effects of their own, further
widening climate change divisions.
Political polarity of climate change
Since the 1970s, American politics experienced increasing polarization on racial, cultural, and
social welfare issues (Layman et al. 2006). Despite largely unified scientific support, climate
change has become one of the most divisive issues among the general public. Early studies of
climate change perceptions presumed the problem was a lack of factual information, which could
be supplied. Research finds only partial support for this simple information deficit hypothesis,
however (Hamilton 2008, Hart and Nisbet 2011, Kahan et al. 2012, Hamilton et al. 2012, Zhou
2016, Ehret et al. 2017). Although education and scientific literacy have detectable effects,
compatible with information deficit, political indicators exhibit stronger and more consistent
effects.
In the United States, political party or ideology are now the dominant predictors of
perceptions about anthropogenic climate change, as well as many other environment and
science-related issues (e.g., Hamilton 2008, 2011, 2014, McCright and Dunlap 2011, McCright
et al. 2014). One feature of the evolving conservative landscape has been the advance of the Tea
Party movement since 2009 (McCright et al. 2014). Acknowledging this change, some
researchers elaborate the traditional Democrat/Independent/Republican party model by
distinguishing supporters of the Tea Party movement as a fourth ‘party’ (Hamilton and Saito
2015, Shao 2016). This four-party scheme adds explanatory power across many issues, with Tea
Party supporters consistently expressing more extreme views compared with non-Tea Party
Republicans. Issues exhibiting a clear four-party gradient include not only climate change but
gun control, abortion, the death penalty, evolution, and trust in scientists on various topics
including vaccines (Hamilton 2015, Hamilton and Saito 2015, Hamilton et al. 2015a).
Perceptions about specific aspects of climate change—such as sea level rise, melting polar ice
caps, and animal extinction—also display political and ideological gradients. Age and gender
have somewhat weaker effects on environmental and science question responses. After politics,
education proves to be the most consistent predictor. Education often interacts with politics,
however: education shows positive effects on science acceptance among liberals and moderates
(or Democrats and Independents), but near-zero or even negative effects among the most
conservative (or Tea Party supporters) (e.g., Hamilton 2008, 2011, Hamilton and Saito 2015).
As a result of this interaction, better-educated partisans stand the farthest apart on climate
change. This occurs not only with conventional indicators for education and ideology (e.g.,
McCright and Dunlap 2011, Hamilton 2008, 2011, Hamilton and Saito 2015), but also for other
information indicators such as objectively-assessed science literacy (Hamilton et al. 2012,
Drummond and Fischhoff 2017) or numeracy (Kahan et al. 2011), and also subjectively-assessed
understanding (Hamilton 2011, McCright and Dunlap 2011). Scholars explain such interactions
in top-down terms of more educated or information-rich partisans being more aware of party and
leadership positions, or in bottom-up terms of educated partisans more actively filtering
information to support their beliefs. Although both types of explanations are logical and may
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operate together, their processes tend to be inferred rather than observed in the context of survey
interaction effects.
On average, higher levels of education correlate with greater concern about
environmental problems, consistent with the information deficit model. However, stronger
effects from political identity, and interactions between education and political identity, suggest
selective exposure and similar processes play a greater role which helps to explain why science
literacy is helpful but not sufficient in raising public consensus on climate change. Many studies
have now confirmed interactions of this general type (Hamilton 2008, 2011, Hamilton and Keim
2009, Hamilton et al. 2012, 2015b, Kahan et al. 2011, McCright and Dunlap 2011, Shao et al.
2014, Kahan 2015, Drummond and Fischhoff 2017). Such interactions also affect other
environment or science-related issues besides the climate, including evolution, vaccines,
scientists, or environmental protection (Hamilton et al. 2010, 2015a, Hamilton and Safford 2015,
Hamilton and Saito 2015). In most of these studies, interpretations of the interaction results have
mentioned (but not analyzed) the selective acquisition of information.
The role of news media
Elite cues
Several theories offer insight into the influential role of American news media. The elite cues
hypothesis suggests individuals form opinions based on cues given by elites with whom they
identify. Brulle and colleagues (2012) investigate five diverse factors potentially affecting
Americans’ concern for climate change and find substantial support for elite cues. They argue
that, while media itself is influential, it more importantly provides viewers with elite cues that
influence their position on particular issues (2012, p. 176). Similarly, Darmofal (2005) identifies
political elites as highly influential in challenging expert opinion, regardless of the argument’s
validity. Guber (2013) notes the role of information in ideological party sorting as people
become aware of party elite positions.
Other studies look specifically at the role of cable television news (Zhao 2009, Krosnick
and MacInnis 2010, Stroud 2011, Feldman et al. 2012). For example, regular viewers of Fox
News hear more dismissive arguments against anthropogenic climate change, and are less likely
to accept its reality, compared with viewers of other networks (Krosnick and MacInnis 2010,
Feldman et al. 2012). Although public radio is sometimes perceived as liberal in orientation, it
carries local and national content with a broad informative rather than political focus, including
many conversations with scientists in their fields of expertise. Hamilton (2014) finds New
Hampshire public radio audiences are significantly more inclined than consumers of other local
news to trust scientists and accept the scientific consensus on anthropogenic climate change.
Preference for public radio as an information source consequently coincides to some degree with
preference for and exposure to ordinary science (Hamilton 2014). Using National Public Radio
as a measure for non-conservative media, Feldman and colleagues (2014) find the effects from
ideology are much stronger, and effects from education much weaker, for conservative media
use compared to non-conservative media. Additionally, studies comparing the content of
conservative and non-conservative news media find substantial discrepancies in how climate
change is framed in reporting (Feldman et al. 2012, Nisbet 2009).
A national survey during the 2016 election campaign found examples of such selectivity
in trusted authorities on climate science. Among Trump supporters, conservative Fox News was
the second most trusted source for information about climate change: 61% trust scientists while
49% trust the conservative news source (Hamilton 2016b). Furthermore, supporters of the
4

Republican presidential candidate were least trusting of political leaders in their party for climate
change information (Hamilton 2016b). Although Trump’s anti-establishment rhetoric may
contribute to these differences, his supporters trust Fox News more than religious leaders,
friends, or websites. These results further support characterizations of Fox News as influential,
providing elite cues that link viewers’ political identity with specific beliefs about climate
change and other science topics.
Reinforcing spirals
The reinforcing spirals framework connects ideas of selective exposure and biased assimilation:
individuals seek out information sources that reaffirm biases while strengthening their position
through repeated exposure to those sources (Slater 2007). Individuals use motivated reasoning to
process information in a biased manner that reinforces their predispositions (Taber and Lodge
2006, Feldman et al. 2014).
One recent study explores this process using a two-wave survey to test the effects of
media selectivity. Feldman and colleagues (2014) apply the reinforcing spirals framework in
their study on selective exposure and global warming attitudes. Utilizing a longitudinal design,
they conduct two waves to test the long-term effects of news media in shaping beliefs and policy
support. Their model demonstrates the reinforcing processes of partisan media influencing
climate change certainty and policy support which in turn drives subsequent media use. They
found conservative or non-conservative media use at Wave 1 increased subsequent media use at
Wave 2. Additionally, positions on climate change certainty and policy support for mitigation
strengthened from the first to second wave. As a result, Feldman and colleagues argue partisan
media use and position on climate change reinforce one another through indirect effects.
Furthermore, conservative media use lowers acceptance of the reality and policy
implications of global warming, whereas the opposite is true for non-conservative media use.
Differences between conservative and non-conservative media suggest the former acts as an
‘echo chamber’ making it more susceptible to reinforcement (Feldman et al. 2014). Feldman and
coauthors describe the spiraling effect regarding Fox News:
They provide consistent political messaging, which influences political beliefs,
and these beliefs in turn drive people back to the media which support these
beliefs and away from media that do not, in a repeating cycle. (p. 604)
Additionally, studies find conservatives are more susceptible to reinforcing spirals compared to
liberals (McCright 2011, McCright and Dunlap 2011). McCright suggests this is because climate
change poses a greater threat to the existing industrial economic system than previous
environmental problems, leading conservatives to engage in ‘strong system-justifying attitudes’
(2011, p. 249). The polarization observed among conservatives becomes apparent when exposed
to information that contradicts existing beliefs.
Hypotheses
Considering the politicization of climate change and cable news, we expect to find that
demographic characteristics and political identity affect information source preferences in ways
parallel to their effects on climate change views. That is, preferred news media and belief in
anthropogenic climate change will be similarly affected by age, sex, education, political identity,
and the interaction between education and politics. Consequently, we model source preferences
as intervening variables influenced by background, but capable also of further effects on beliefs
5

about climate. We anticipate political identity will exhibit stronger relationships to more
politicized sources; specifically, Fox News will be the preferred information source for
conservatives and public radio for liberals. Choice of politicized news media would be an
obvious sign of selective exposure, which in itself could reinforce politically-linked
predispositions to reject anthropogenic climate change. We expect education, and its interaction
with political identity, will exhibit polarizing effects for more politicized sources. Finally, we
hypothesize that media preferences will show independent effects of their own on beliefs about
climate, which results in even wider divisions.
Methods
Data
The data used in this study are 3,852 interviews conducted in six individual surveys over a
period from July 2015 to May 2016 for the Granite State Poll (GSP). The University of New
Hampshire’s Survey Center operates this statewide random-sample telephone survey, obtaining a
mean response rate of 19 percent over the study period (definition 4, AAPOR 2006).
Interviewers record demographic information including sex, age, and education. In addition to
demographic questions, the poll asks about a variety of political, environmental, and news media
topics.
The GSP includes three standard questions gauging political identity. Interviewers ask
respondents for which party they are registered to vote and, separately, whether they support the
Tea Party movement. These two questions together provide a four-party political indicator that
has been successfully tested in several studies (Hamilton and Saito 2015; Hamilton et al. 2015a).
A third political question asks respondents to characterize their ideology, from liberal to
conservative. Interviewers also ask whether respondents think that climate change ‘is happening
now, caused mainly by human activities,’ ‘happening now, but caused mainly by natural forces,’
or ‘not happening now.’ Some respondents say they do not know, or give no answer. These
particular surveys also carried questions about the frequency with which the respondent uses
news media sources including New Hampshire Public Radio, a local TV station, and Fox News.
Response distributions for the news media and climate change questions are charted in Figure 1.
Table 1 gives the wording for these and other questions, together with response percentages and
codes later used for statistical modeling.
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Figure 1. Frequency of news viewership by information source (a through c) – Fox News, public
radio, and local TV news – and distribution of climate change beliefs (d). Weighted percentages
from Granite State Polls conducted during 2015–2016.

All graphs and analyses reported here employ probability weights, which accomplish
minor adjustments to better represent the population of New Hampshire. The Granite State Poll
weights adjust for known design bias (related to household size and number of telephones), and
minor differences between the samples and state population with regard to geography, gender
and age.
New Hampshire residents are politically divided on climate change, much like the nation
as a whole (Hamilton et al. 2015b). More than half think that climate change is happening now,
caused mainly by human activities. Only a third think that the climate is changing, but mainly
from natural forces. Overall, 90% of respondents believe climate change is happening now—
whether from natural or human causes—compared to 10% who answered that climate change is
not happening or do not know. Figure 1d thus shows broad agreement that climate change is
happening, although there are sharp divisions over the cause.
Of the three media choices mentioned in our surveys, respondents viewed local TV news
most heavily. Over half of respondents report watching at least several times a week. Public
radio has the second largest audience with 31% listening regularly, followed by 24% who
regularly watch Fox News. A 2013 Gallup poll reported that 55% of Americans use television as
their main source of news followed by the internet (21%) and radio (6%) (Saad 2013).
Differences between national and New Hampshire news preferences likely reflect the more
specific information sources asked about in GSP surveys.
7

Table 1. Definitions of variables from Granite State Poll (GSP) survey of New Hampshire residents
conducted from July 2015 to May 2016 (n = 3,852).
Climate change question
Climate Change: Which of the following three statements do you think is more accurate? (Answers
rotated)
Don’t Know/Not Sure (coded 0; 6%)
Climate change is not happening now (coded 0; 5%)
Climate change is happening now, but caused by natural forces (coded 0; 27%)
Climate change is happening now, caused mainly by human activities (coded 1; 63%)
News media question
Fox News: How often, if ever, do you watch Fox News?
Never/Don’t Know (coded 0; 48%)
Occasionally (coded 0; 29%)
Several times a week (coded 1; 10%)
Every day (coded 1; 14%)
Public Radio News: How often, if ever, do you listen to New Hampshire Public Radio?
Never/Don’t Know (coded 0; 40%)
Occasionally (coded 0; 29%)
Several times per week (coded 1; 14%)
Every day (coded 1; 18%)
Local TV News: How often, if ever, do you watch WMUR, Channel 9 News?
Never/Don’t Know (coded 0; 17%)
Occasionally (coded 0; 28%)
Several times per week (coded 1; 18%)
Every day (coded 1; 37%)
Respondent background characteristics
Ideology: In politics, do you generally think of yourself as a liberal, a moderate, or a conservative?
Liberal (coded –2; 21%)
Moderate Liberal (coded –1; 21%)
Moderate (coded 0; 14%)
Moderate Conservative (coded 1; 24%)
Conservative (coded 2; 19%)
Party: Are you registered as a Democrat, Independent, Republican or something else? Would you say
you lean towards supporting or opposing the Tea Party movement?
Democrat (coded –1; 42%)
Independent (coded 0; 16%)
Republican (coded 1; 24%)
Tea Party (coded 2; 18%)
Age: (mean 48 years, range 18 – 96 years)
Sex:
Male (coded 0; 49%)
Female (coded as 1; 51%)
Education: What is the highest grade in school, or level of education that you’ve completed and got
credit for?
High School or less (coded –1; 19%)
Some College (coded 0; 24%)
College Graduate (coded 1; 35%)
Postgraduate (coded 2; 23%)
Note. Interviewers rotated the order of response choices. Probability-weighted proportions or means without missing
data.
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Variables
Although the positions that climate is not changing, or that it is changing but for natural reasons,
appear to be logically distinct, survey data suggest that they are socially less distinct. People
might easily shift between them, as public arguments often do. Those holding the contrary
position that climate is changing due mainly to human activities (anthropogenic climate change),
by contrast, appear socially more distinct from both the not-changing and naturally-changing
groups. Moreover, this position uniquely corresponds to the overwhelming, evidence-based
consensus among scientists. For purposes of this study, we therefore contrast those who believe
in anthropogenic climate change (our now/human-caused response) with all other views on this
topic. Our final endogenous variable is a (0,1) indicator for belief in anthropogenic climate
change. Additionally, the model incorporates information choices as intervening variables. The
news media questions each offer four response choices, from ‘never’ to ‘every day.’ We also
dichotomize these items for statistical modeling, grouping ‘every day’ and ‘several times per
week’ responses together. Dichotomization makes the modeling results easier to interpret and
compare. We also tested alternative versions (not shown) that retain the original ordinal coding,
and confirmed that these obtain substantially similar results.
The exogenous variables are age, sex, education, political party, and political ideology.
We treat education as ordinal rather than continuous to represent increments in professional
qualification. The model incorporates political party as a fourth party based on findings that Tea
Party supporters are distinct from non-Tea Party Republicans in important ways (Hamilton and
Saito 2015, McCright et al. 2014, Shao 2016). Political party and ideology are individually
strong predictors when included together in the model, even though support for the Tea Party
movement has declined during the past several years mainly due to the funneling of party
contributions to consultants rather than candidates (Bartlett 2013, Lipton and Steinhauer 2015).
Lastly, the model incorporates interaction effects between political ideology and education
reliably found in previous research (e.g., Hamilton 2011, 2016a, Hamilton et al. 2012, McCright
and Dunlap 2011). We use political ideology rather than party in the interaction for better
consistency going forward in an evolving political environment marked by erosion of Tea Party
identification.
Results
Generalized structural equation modeling (GSEM) extends the well-known analytical framework
of structural equation modeling (SEM). SEM originally encompassed only linear regression-type
models, whereas GSEM permits logit, probit, and other type of models under a generalized linear
modeling approach. Thus, GSEM (unlike SEM) allows us to estimate effects in structural
equation models where endogenous variables are dichotomous or categorical—as with these
climate and news-preference items. Like SEM, GSEM permits models with intervening variables
so we can examine both direct and indirect effects. For the dichotomous endogenous variables
studied here, we employ a logistic regression version (logit link function, Bernoulli distribution
family).
Figure 2 depicts our structural equation model. To keep this readable, we draw in only
the statistically significant effects, representing these as solid (positive) or dashed (negative)
lines. The underlying statistical model includes all possible effects, however. In this model
respondent age, sex, education, ideology, and education are exogenous. We also include an
education×ideology interaction term among the exogenous predictors. Three media-use items
indicating frequent attention to Fox News, public radio, or local TV news are included as
9

intervening endogenous variables. The final endogenous variable indicates whether respondents
think that climate change is happening now, caused mainly by human activities. The structural
equation model involves four equations, as detailed with parameter estimates, standard errors,
and significance test results in Table 2.

Figure 2. Path diagram showing significant relationships of the structural equation model found
in Table 2. Solid lines represent a significant positive relationship between variables; dashed
lines represent a significant negative relationship.
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Table 2. Results from generalized structural equation modeling using weighted logit regression (n =
2,977).
Predictor
Fox News
Public Radio
Local TV News
Climate
Age
0.026(0.003)***
0.012(0.003)***
0.033(0.003)*** –0.017(0.003)***
Sex
0.055(0.113)
– 0.324(0.097)**
0.419(0.090)***
0.235(0.109)*
Party
0.724(0.061)***
– 0.213(0.055)***
0.056(0.049)
– 0.523(0.055)***
Ideology
0.294(0.055)***
– 0.175(0.054)**
0.074(0.044)
– 0.394(0.049)***
Education
– 0.136(0.061)*
0.338(0.048)***
– 0.223(0.045)***
0.210(0.053)***
Ed × Ideo
0.154(0.044)***
– 0.123(0.036)**
0.087(0.031)**
– 0.130(0.039)**
Fox News
– 0.748(0.125)***
Public Radio
0.497(0.122)***
Local TV
0.322(0.115)**
Constant
– 2.839(0.212)***
– 1.449(0.167)***
– 1.365(0.153)***
1.298(0.184)***
Adjusted
0.192
0.139
0.186
0.364
Count R2
Note. Model entries are unstandardized logit regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses.
*p < 0.05; **p < 0.01; ***p < 0.001

All exogenous variables display statistically significant direct effects on climate beliefs,
but political views—represented by party and ideology—are the strongest. Both ideology (b =
– 0.394, p < 0.001) and party (b = – 0.523, p < 0.001) effects confirm that the probability of
belief in anthropogenic climate change decreases with conservatism. The main effect of
education (b = 0.21) is positive, indicating that education increases the probability of belief in
human-caused climate change among ideologically moderate respondents (ideology = 0). The
interaction between political ideology and education (b = – 0.13, p < 0.01) indicates that the
positive education–climate relationships is stronger (more positive) among moderate liberals and
liberals; however, it becomes negative among the most conservative. Age has a negative effect
on belief in anthropogenic climate change (b = – 0.017, p < 0.001), and sex (female) a positive
effect (b = 0.235, p < 0.05), consistent with much previous research. Younger adults and women
are more inclined to agree with the scientific consensus on anthropogenic climate change.
Differences in age and sex also influence news media preferences. Age has small, but
consistent effects: older individuals attend more to all types of news. Sex has less consistent
effects. It is the strongest predictor for local TV news audiences (b = 0.419, p < 0.001) with
women much more likely to regularly watch local TV news than men. In contrast, public radio
audiences are slightly more likely to be male (b = – 0.324, p < 0.01). Fox News viewership
exhibits no significant gender difference (b = – 0.055).
Political ideology, party, and education effects highlight distinctions between audience
demographics for Fox News, public radio, and local TV. Unsurprisingly, both party (b = 0.724, p
< 0.001) and ideology (b = 0.294, p < 0.001) significantly affect Fox News watching: it is
highest among conservatives. Liberals more often listen to public radio, as demonstrated by the
significant negative relationship with political party and ideology. Respondents with higher
education are less likely to watch local TV news, but more likely to listen to public radio.
Interestingly, education exhibits a significant but weak main effect on Fox News viewership.
However, the significant interactions affecting all three news choices somewhat complicate this
picture.
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Education×ideology interactions affecting all three news sources expand upon previous
studies (Sears and Freedman 1967, Taber and Lodge 2006, Stroud 2011), establishing that
ideological divergence among preferences grows wider with education. This is consistent with
the selective exposure hypothesis: more educated individuals are demonstrably more selective in
their information choices, and especially so regarding sources commonly seen as conservative
(Fox News) or liberal (public radio) in outlook. These interactions are visualized by adjusted
marginal plots in Figure 3. Both Fox News (b = 0.154, p < 0.001) and public radio (b = – 0.123,
p < 0.001) have relatively strong interaction effects, but opposite in sign. Fox News viewership
increases with education among conservatives, whereas public radio listenership increases with
education among liberals. Although the education×ideology effect on local TV news viewership
(b = 0.087, p < 0.01) is similar in shape to that for Fox News, it is much weaker.

Figure 3. Viewership of information sources and belief in anthropogenic climate change by
education across political ideologies.

Exogenous variables such as education and ideology influence climate beliefs directly,
but also indirectly through their effects on media preferences. Information choice affects climate
beliefs in turn, and with the directions that one might expect. Fox News viewership shows a
negative effect on belief in human-caused climate change (b = – 0.748, p < 0.001). Public radio
listening (b = 0.497, p < 0.001) and local TV news watching (b = 0.322, p < 0.01), on the other
hand, each exhibit positive effects. That all three of our specific news media indicators show
party, ideology, and education×ideology effects fits with selective exposure and biased
assimilation interpretation of such interactions affecting climate change beliefs. More educated
12

partisans tend to choose ideologically-aligned information sources. Similar patterns might
reasonably be expected for other information sources (such as websites and talk radio) that were
not tested here.
Scholars have proposed a number of alternative methods for estimating and testing
indirect effects in logit and other nonlinear models. We applied the product-of-coefficients
method described by Breen et al. (2013), which is computationally simple yet performs
competitively in Monte Carlo evaluations. Results from these 24 additional coefficients and their
tests are not listed in Table 2, but can be summarized as follows. Age has significant indirect
effects on climate beliefs through all three media choices. Sex exhibits significant effects only
through public radio and local TV preference. Party and ideology in comparison have significant
indirect effects through the more ideologically-linked sources, Fox News and public radio. Both
education and the education×ideology interaction show significant indirect effects through all
three news sources. Thus, most of the path sequences that can be traced in Figure 2 correspond to
statistically significant indirect effects. In all cases, these indirect effects have the expected signs.
The direct effects from all three news items also mean that ideology, education, and other
background characteristics affect climate beliefs not just directly, but indirectly through media
choices that further reinforce pre-existing beliefs. Furthermore, because news preferences also
show independent effects even after adjusting for individual backgrounds, we can infer that news
media content itself contributes to polarization. The analysis gives a cross-sectional view of the
reinforcing spirals process through which political identity affects choice of information sources,
and the content of those sources can reinforce and amplify divisions.
Discussion
Our data and analysis focus on climate change, a topic that has become so polarized that it
behaves like a core indicator for political outlook alongside ideology and party (Kahan 2015).
U.S. public perceptions of climate change are socially remarkable and globally important. The
dynamics of selective exposure have acquired even greater prominence since we designed our
research. With the 2016 presidential election campaign and subsequent developments,
‘alternative facts’ promulgated with political intent and targeted to ideologically-receptive
audiences through their preferred media sources have become a major force in U.S. politics.
Much as the ‘climategate’ hacking and edited release of scientists’ emails in 2009 foreshadowed
the hacking of Democratic National Committee emails in 2016, a long tradition of counterfactual
assertions on climate change (Dunlap and McCright 2015) appears now to have foreshadowed a
situation where counterfactual assertions about almost anything can be boosted to wide currency.
The selective exposure process studied here with regard to climate change expanded dramatically
to encompass many other topics.
More narrowly, our study contributes to the literature on polarization of climate change
perceptions. We find evidence that political ideology and party predict climate change beliefs not
just directly but indirectly, through exposure to politically-aligned information sources. The
predictors of news media preferences resemble those for climate beliefs themselves, including
the detail of similar education×ideology interactions. With such selection, news media will often
help to confirm existing prejudices regarding climate change and many other topics. However,
news media also have independent effects, net of their audience’s background politics, which
could amplify divisions. These findings connect several themes in the literature.
First, they depict processes of selective exposure and confirmation bias, especially among
conservative audiences. Political party and ideology predict both Fox News and public radio
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preferences, but the Fox News preference is more strongly politicized—as shown by
substantially larger party and ideology main effects, as well as a somewhat stronger
education×ideology interaction. This interaction, visualized in Figure 3a, reverses the sign of
education effects. Fox News preference rises with education among conservatives while
declining with education among liberals. Public radio preference (Figure 3b) exhibits virtually no
effect from education among conservatives, but a substantial positive effect among liberals.
Regarding local TV news preference (Figure 3c), there is no positive effect from education
among any of the ideological groups. Moderates as well as liberals with higher education
become progressively less likely to watch local TV news.
The weak main effect from education on Fox News viewership, especially compared to
other information choices, supports previous research suggesting conservatives are more likely to
seek news media that support their predispositions. Studies of selective exposure (Sears and
Freedman 1967, Feldman et al. 2014) sometimes depict this as a process equally prevalent on the
left and right. However, observation of contemporary candidate and political media positions
suggests that mainstream conservatives more often express opposition to core areas of science on
topics ranging from climate change to evolution, the age of the Earth, or vaccines. Surveys
confirm this impression of greater conservative distrust of science across a wider range of topics
(Gauchat 2012, Nadelson et al. 2014, Hamilton and Saito 2015, Hamilton et al. 2015a, Nisbet et
al. 2015).
The strong education×ideology effect on Fox News preference connects to the literature
in other ways as well. Fox News viewers tend to be more politically homogenous compared to
consumers of non-conservative news media, suggesting conservatives engage in motivated
reasoning to identify sources that provide confirming information (Feldman et al. 2014).
Conservative news media acts as an ‘echo chamber’ to reinforce predispositions (Feldman et al.
2012, 2014). Additionally, conservatives exhibit greater polarization when exposed to
disconfirming information. Corner and colleagues’ (2012) finding that biased assimilation can
occur independently of attitude polarization supports this notion. Accounting for most of
education’s individual effect, the strong interaction effect between education and ideology in this
study illustrates the impact of conservatism in selecting information sources. The reinforcing
spirals framework effectively illustrates the cycle as background predictors influence news
media choices that reinforce existing beliefs and promotes subsequent use (Feldman et al. 2014).
In a nationwide study, almost 80% of Fox News viewers describe their political ideology as
conservative and two-thirds identify as Republican (Saad 2013). In sum, Fox News provides
conservatives with messaging that supports their political beliefs, an identity so influential it
moderates differences in education.
We find that news media preferences are more directly predictive of climate change
beliefs than education. Acceptance of anthropogenic climate change decreases with Fox News
viewership, increases with public radio listenership, and increases also (but less steeply) with
local TV viewership. However, because better-educated partisans more actively select
compatible media sources, the indirect and total effects of education on climate beliefs are more
complicated. For liberals, indirect effects add to and strengthen the total effect of education:
Educated liberals are more likely to listen to public radio and less likely to watch Fox News, both
of which (other things being equal) increase the probability of believing that humans are
changing the climate. For conservatives on the other hand, a mix of positive and negative
indirect effects through information sources tends to weaken the total effect of education so that
political identity dominates.
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The link between conservative or liberal news media and climate change beliefs lends
support to the elite cues hypothesis, a top-down aspect of biased assimilation. Previous research
suggests that elite cues from prominent political leaders, those most influential in challenging
expert opinion, are transmitted to the public through news media (Brulle et al. 2012, Darmofal
2005). While there are considerable differences between conservative and non-conservative
media in how climate change is framed in reporting (Nisbet 2009, Feldman et al. 2012), framing
can become ineffective on highly politicized issues (Zhou 2016). Partisan information sources
are especially ripe environments for transmitting elite cues and supplying message frames that
reinforce existing beliefs.
Much of the research on information and climate change perceptions cites cross-sectional
nationally representative surveys (Hamilton 2008, Zhao 2009, 2011, Hamilton et al. 2012, Guber
2013, Feldman et al. 2014) or experimental designs (Hart and Nisbet 2011, Corner et al. 2012,
McCright et al. 2013, Zhou 2016). By using the Granite State Poll we limit the nominal scope of
this analysis to New Hampshire residents, but other studies making detailed U.S.–New
Hampshire comparisons suggest the latter provides a close proxy on climate topics (e.g.,
Hamilton et al. 2015b, Hamilton 2016a, 2016b, 2017).
Conclusion
As one of the most polarizing issues in U.S. politics today, climate change presents a substantial
challenge for science communication. News media play a central role that can either be
constructive, exposing their audience to different perspectives and evidence-based information,
or manipulative and divisive. Fox News and similar information sources have influenced public
perceptions of this scientific topic just as they have of more clearly political issues in the United
States. When people express high confidence in beliefs about science that contradict the
scientific evidence, understanding how those beliefs developed and are maintained against
contradictions becomes crucial. Communication processes such as selective exposure, elite cues,
and reinforcing spirals allow biased information sources to amplify ideology-based differences,
attenuating the potential for influence by outside experts and evidence. Survey data analysis
provides a cross-sectional view of these processes, which are broadly reshaping American
perceptions of reality. Similar processes undoubtedly occur in other countries too, but to variable
degrees that should be a focus of new comparative research. Studies in the U.S. and elsewhere
could help in finding escape routes from this cycle, not by confronting those deep in its grip, but
by identifying groups and subtopics with less restricted sources, so that better evidence and
science communication have a chance to get through.
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